b) The wishes, feelings and interests of the parents and the likely impact of the decision on each of them are of great importance, but in the context of evaluating and determining the welfare of the child.

c) In either type of relocation case, external or internal, a Judge is likely to find helpful some or all of the considerations referred to in Payne v Payne [2001] 1 FLR 1052; but not as a prescriptive blueprint; rather and merely as a checklist of the sort of factors which will or may need to be weighed in the balance when determining which decision would better serve the welfare of the child.’

• The likely effect on him or her of any change in circumstances – the parent seeking the change must show that such a change is in the child’s interests.

• Any harm which he or she has suffered or is at risk of suffering. This can include harm from primary carer being unhappy, harm from severance of relationship with left behind parent or harm from the loss of their life here.

• How capable each of his or her parents (or any other person the court considers relevant) is of meeting his or her needs.

• Is the motivation to move genuine?

• Demonstrate that there are practical proposals that are well researched and investigated – the devil is in the detail (practice the alleged travel arrangements, try out and time the proposed new school run at the right time of day etc.)

• Is the opposition to the move motivated by genuine concern? What is the detriment to the non-resident parent and can it be offset?

• What would be the impact of refusal on the parent wishing to relocate?

• To what extent can contact continue and what would be the impact of the reduction in contact with the left behind parent? Can the parent seeking to move be trusted to promote the relationship with the other parent – has history demonstrated this? What is the quality of the contact? How will it work in practice given the ages and stages of the children?

• Could the left behind parent also move? What connections, if any, does the other parent have with the new area? How easy or difficult would it be to establish some? Is there a language barrier? Are there any visa/ immigration requirements? Could the other parent work (if they intend to do so)? What would be the impact on the other parent of separation from his home environment?

(b) There is no presumption in favour of the applicant parent.

(c) The reasonable proposals of the parent with a residence order wishing to live abroad carry great weight.

(d) Consequently, the proposals have to be scrutinised with care and the court needs to be satisfied that there is a genuine motivation for the move and not the intention to bring contact between the child and the other parent to an end.

(e) The effect upon the applicant parent and the new family of the child of a refusal of leave is very important.

(f) The effect upon the child of the denial of contact with the other parent and in some cases his family is very important.

(g) The opportunity for continuing contact between the child and the parent left behind may be very significant.

“All the above observations have been made on the premise that the question of residence is not a live issue. If, however, there is a real dispute as to which parent should be granted a residence order, and the decision as to which parent is the more suitable is finely balanced, the future plans of each parent for the child are clearly relevant. If one parent intends to set up home in another country and remove the child from school, surroundings and the other parent and his family, it may in some cases be an important factor to weigh in the balance. But in a case where the decision as to residence is clear as the judge in this case clearly thought it was, the plans for removal from the jurisdiction would not be likely to be significant in the decision over residence. The mother in this case already had a residence order and the judge`s decision on residence was not an issue before this Court.”

In S & V (Children – Leave to remove)[2018] EWFC 26, C Moysten summarised the available law as follows:

a) The principle of the paramountcy of the children's best interests, as outlined by the checklist in section 1(3) of the 1989 Act, which is not to be glossed, augmented or steered by any presumption in favour of the putative relocator – see further re K (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 931, Re G;

(b) Lord Justice Thorpe's famous "discipline" in Payne v Payne [2001] 1 FLR 1052 is now relegated to no more than guidance, which can be drawn on, or not, as the individual case demands;

(c) If the applicant's case is not well thought out and is not supported by evidence it will likely fail;

(d) If the applicant's case, or the respondent's defence, is not advanced in good faith but rather is driven by an unworthy ulterior motive, then that case, or defence, will fail;

(e) The court must consider the impact on the mother if the application is refused as well as the impact on the father if it is granted (or visa versa);

(f) The court must undertake a "global" or "holistic" or "360 degree" exercise;

(g) The court's function in a relocation case is one of evaluation rather than a pure exercise of discretion (see Kacem v Bashir [2010] NZSC 112, [2011] 2 NZLR 1, [2010] NZFLR 884);

(h) The court will have to resolve disputed facts and there is a burden of proof on the party alleging the facts in issue, but once the facts are established there is no formal legal burden of proof on the applicant (see Payne v Payne at para 25 per Thorpe LJ: "I do not think that such concepts of presumption and burden of proof have any place in Children Act litigation where the judge exercises a function that is partly inquisitorial.");

(i) Common sense dictates that where one parent seeks that a well-functioning status quo should be changed he/she has to make the running in terms of the evidence and argument to show that change would be more in the children's interests than no change. Notwithstanding the partly inquisitorial function of the court the maxim affirmati non neganti incumbit probation (the proof rests on those who are affirmed and not on those who deny) should loosely apply to the case for change;

(j) There is no principle in Children Act litigation that a new spouse takes subject to the claims of the old one (see, for money cases, Vaughan v Vaughan [2010] EWCA Civ 349, [2011] Fam 46). However, if someone forms a relationship with a woman who has children from a prior relationship where the father of those children is enjoying a stable regime of contact, then the new partner must surely be taken to enter the relationship, with all its incumbrances, with his eyes wide open.  On the other hand, the father of those children must surely recognise the prospect of his former wife re-partnering and in that event a case for change being advanced. The weight to be attributed to these two general propositions will depend on the facts of the case in hand.

(k) Arguments in relation to the devastation and impact of refusal of the relocating parent should be treated very circumspectly - Re AR (A child: Relocation) [2010] EWHC 1346 (Fam).

Re F (A Child) (2010): This case clarified the court's approach in relocation cases, emphasizing that the focus should be on the child's welfare and that no presumption should be made in favour of or against relocation.

Re H (Children) (2017): In this case, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of considering the child's best interests and welfare when making decisions in child relocation cases.